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COMMENT
THE HEARSAY RULE AND THE RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION:
STATES' LEEWAY IN FORULATING
EVIDENTIARY RULES
I. INTRODUCTION
The first ten amendments were adopted by the founding fathers to alleviate
the fears of the ratifying state legislatures that the Constitution, absent such
protections, would abrogate many of the rights long recognized by English
common law.' Thus, the purpose of the confrontation clause of the sixth amend-
ment was to guarantee that, in a criminal case, a defendant would have sub-
stantially the same rights that were afforded by the hearsay rule-confrontation
and cross-examination.2 Since the hearsay rule and the right to confrontation
both reflect the view that some evidence should not be admitted unless the
declarant testifies at trial or has been subjected to cross-examination, 3 it was
thought that allowing a statement to be admitted only under a hearsay exception
would provide adequate protection4 and, thus, would not violate a defendant's
constitutional rights.5 However, as a result of a series of Supreme Court cases
beginning with Pointer v. Texas6 and ending with Britton v. United States,1 the
lower courts8 have held, with the approval of the commentators," that the rights
provided by the confrontation clause were so basic that even the admission of
an extrajudical statement admissible under a hearsay exception would violate
1. See Sources of Our Liberties 420 (R. Perry & J. Cooper eds. 1959) [hereinafter cited
as Perry & Cooper]; Larkin, The Right of Confrontation: What Next?, 1 Texas Tech. L.
Rev. 67, 76 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Larkin]; Pollitt, The Right of Confrontation: Its
History and Mlodem Dress, 8 J. Pub. L. 381, 399 (1959).
2. 5 J. Wigmore, Evidence §§ 1365, 1395 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited by volume as
Wigmore].
3. Id.
4. Id. § 1397, at 130-31.
5. See, e.g., Salinger v. United States, 272 U.S. 542, 548 (1926); Robertson v. Baldwin,
165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897) ("[T]he first ten amendments to the Constitution, commonly known
as the Bill of Rights, were not intended to lay down any novel principles of government, but
simply to embody certain guaranties [sic] and immunities which we had inherited from our
English ancestors, and which had from time immemorial been subject to certain well-recog-
nized exceptions arising from the necessities of the case. In incorporating these principles into
the fundamental law there was no intention of disregarding the exceptions, which continued to
be recognized as if they had been formally expressed."); Note, Preserving the Right to Con-
frontation-A New Approach to Hearsay Evidence in Criminal Trials, 113 U. Pa. L. Rev.
741, 746 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Preserving the Right to Confrontation].
6. 380 US. 400 (1965).
7. 391 US. 123 (1968).
8. See notes 81-90 and accompanying text infra.
9. See notes 77-80 and accompanying text infra.
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the clause. This view lead to an inevitable question regarding the breadth of a
defendant's right to confrontation: Does it prohibit the use of all evidence
admitted under traditional hearsay exceptions? It was in the face of this un-
certainty that the Supreme Court decided a trilogy of cases-California v.
Green,'0 Dutton v. Evans," and Nelson v. O'Neil'2-which indicate that the
right to confrontation is not as broad as it was originally thought to be. This
comment will examine these cases and the apparent trend of the Court's thinking
in this area.
II. HiSTORY OF THE HEARSAY RumE
Hearsay evidence was freely admitted at early common law.' 3 This was the
natural consequence of Sixteenth Century thinking regarding the criminal trial
-a proceeding of "inquest or recognition."' 14 During this period, witnesses
were not called to testify as to their personal knowledge.' 5 Rather, it was the
normal function of the jury to seek them out and gather information from those
not called into court. 6 However, as the trial evolved from an investigative to an
adversary proceeding, hearsay came to be regarded as a threat to the fact-finding
process.17 Jurors became triers of fact who relied upon testimony presented in
court.18 In response, courts soon developed a rule excluding extrajudicial state-
ments offered to prove the truth of the proposition stated.'0 The admission of
10. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
11. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
12. 402 U.S. 622 (1971).
13. Wigmore, The History of the Hearsay Rule, 17 Harv. L. Rev. 437, 443 (1904). A
famous example is provided by the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh for treason in 1603. Raleigh
was implicated in a plot to seize the throne by the statements of one Cobham, However,
when Raleigh received a written retraction from Cobham, he believed that Cobham would
testify in his favor. After a dispute over Raleigh's right to have Cobham called as a witness,
he was not called and Raleigh was convicted. See 9 W. Holdsworth, A History of English
Law 216-17, 226-28 (1926).
14. Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 Harv. L.
Rev. 177, 180 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Morgan].
15. 5 Wigmore § 1364, at 10-12.
16. Id.; II F. Pollock & R. Maitland, The History of English Law 622 (2d ed. 1968). "In-
deed it is the duty of the jurors, so soon as they have been summoned, to make inquiries
about the facts of which they will have to speak when they come before the court. They
must collect testimony .... ." Id. at 624-25 (footnote omitted). "At the least a fortnight had
been given them in which to 'certify themselves' of the facts. We know of no rule of law which
prevented them from listening during this interval to the tale of the litigants.. .. " Id. at
627 (footnote omitted). "Separately or collectively, in court or out of court, they have
listened to somebody's story and believed it." Id. at 628. See Wigmore, The History of the
Hearsay Rule, 17 Harv. L. Rev. 437, 438-41 (1904).
17. 5 Wigmore § 1364, at 12-15; Comment, Confrontation, Cross-Examination, and the
Right to Prepare a Defense, 56 Geo. LJ. 939, 940 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Right to Pre-
pare a Defense]; Wheaton, What is Hearsay?, 46 Iowa L. Rev. 210, 219-22 (1961).
18. 5 Wigmore § 1364, at 12; Morgan 181.
19. C. McCormick, Evidence § 223 (1954) [hereinafter cited as McCormick]; see La Placa
v. United States, 354 F.2d 56 (1st Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 927 (1966); Cannady v.
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such statements was prohibited because they did not provide sufficient probative
force to convince a trier of fact that the proposition offered was true2 0 The
first objection to the admission of extrajudicial statements was that its declarant
had not made it under oath.2 1 A witness under oath was thought less likely to
lie because he feared both violating a religious symbol and incurring punishment
for perjury32 However, the force of this objection has been blunted somewhat by
the fact that out-of-court statements made under oath are now, on occasion,
excluded. 23 A second objection to hearsay evidence is that the jury has not been
able to test the declarant's credibility by observing his demeanor while on the
witness stand.2 4 The final and, perhaps, most cogent objection to the admission
of such evidence is that the declarant can not be subjected to cross-examination
-- "the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.25 Realizing,
however, that the total exclusion of hearsay evidence would defeat the ends of
justice, courts permitted exceptions where necessity and reliability provided an
adequate substitute for cross-examination.2 0 Thus, for example, dying declara-
tions are not proscribed since it is universally agreed that the "approach of
death produces a state of mind in which the utterances of the dying person are
to be taken as free from all ordinary motives to mis-state.
-
"
2 T
United States, 351 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1965); United States v. Kelly, 349 F2d 720 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 947 (1966); Baber v. United States, 324 F.2d 390 (D.C. Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 972 (1964); United States v. Campanaro, 63 F. Supp. 811 (E.D.
Pa. 1945); People v. Kynette, 15 Cal. 2d 731, 104 P.2d 794 (1940) (per curiam); Dolan v.
United Cas. Co., 259 App. Div. 784, 18 N.Y.S2d 387 (4th Dep't 1940). See generally Morgan,
The Hearsay Rule, 12 Wash. L. Rev. & St. B.J. 1 (1937).
20. Weinstein, Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 Iowa L. Rev. 331 (1961); me Sawyer v.
Barczak, 229 F.2d 805 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 966 (1956); Papadakis v. United
States, 208 F2d 945, 952 (9th Cir. 1953) (dictum); Kinder v. Commonwealth, 306 S.W.2d
265, (Ky. Ct. App. 1957).
21. McCormick § 224, at 457. See Gilbert, The Law of Evidence (6th ed. 1801) "[T]hough
a person testify what he hath heard upon oath, yet the person who spake it was not upon
oath; and if a man had been in Court, and said the same thing, and had not sworn it, he had
not been believed in a Court of justice . . . ." Id. at 135.
22. McCormick § 224, at 457.
23. Morgan 185-86; see Gambino v. United States, 10 F2d 140 (3d Cir. 1939).
24. McCormick § 224, at 457-58; see Universal Camera Corp. v. NlLRB, 340 U.S. 474,
495-96 (1951). See generally Sham, Demeanor Evidence: Elusive and Intangible Imponder-
ables, 47 A.B.AJ. 580 (1961).
25. 5 Wigmore § 1367, at 29.
26. Id. §§ 1420-22, at 202-05; see Sica v. United States, 325 F.2d 831 (9th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 376 US. 952 (1964).
27. 5 Wigmore § 1438, at 230 (emphasis omitted). See Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S.
96 (1933); People v. Bartelini, 285 N.Y. 433, 35 N.E.2d 29 (1941). See generally Quick, Some
Reflections on Dying Declarations, 6 How. L.J. 109 (1960); Comment, The Admissibility of
Dying Declarations, 38 Fordham L. Rev. 509 (1970); Comment, Dying Declarations in Louisi-
ana Law, 22 La. L. Rev. 651 (1962).
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III. HISTORY OF THm RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION
The hearsay rule also provided the historical basis for the sixth amendment
confrontation rule.28 When the Constitution was first drafted by the Second
Continental Congress, it was devoid of any guarantee of procedural rights.20
This lead to strong protest in the state legislatures. The statements of the
Massachusetts convention are typical.30 "[W]hether [a defendant] is to be
allowed to confront the witnesses, and have the advantage of cross-examination,
we are not yet told.... [W] e have not the smallest constitutional security that we
shall be allowed the exercise of these privileges." 3' 1 To alleviate these fears,
the confrontation provision3 2 was included in the Bill of Rights and was pre-
sented to, and subsequently ratified by, the several states.P In construing the
confrontation clause, the Supreme Court has said:
The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to prevent deposi-
tions or ex parte affidavits, such as were sometimes admitted in civil cases, being used
against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the
witness in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and
sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with
the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the
stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.84
Early courts, 35 in applying the confrontation clause, reasoned that the adop-
28. See F. Heller, The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, A
Study in Constitutional Development 104 (1951); Preserving The Right To Confrontation
746 & n.31.
29. Perry & Cooper 420; Larkin 76.
30. See 2 J. Elliot, Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the
Federal Constitution 1-183 (2d ed. 1836).
31. Id. at 111.
32. U.S. Const. amend. VI states: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . ." For studies on the
historical setting in which the right to confrontation arose see Larkin 70-75; Pollitt, supra
note 1, at 388-98.
33. See Pollitt, supra note 1, at 399.
34. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895). See Kirby v. United States, 174
U.S. 47 (1899), where it was stated: "[A] fact which can be primarily established only by
witnesses cannot be proved against an accused . . . except by witnesses who confront him
at the trial, upon whom he can look while being tried, whom he is entitled to cross-examine,
and whose testimony he may impeach in every mode authorized by the established rules
governing the trial or conduct of criminal cases." Id. at 55. 5 Wigmore § 1365, at 27 states:
"The right of confrontation is the right to the opportunity of cross-examination. Confronta-
tion also involves a subordinate and incidental advantage, namely, the observation by the
tribunal of the witness' demeanor on the stand, as a minor means of judging the value of
his testimony. But this minor advantage is not regarded as essential, i.e., it may be dispensed
with when it is not feasible. Cross-examination, however, the essential object of confronta-
tion, remains indispensible."
35. In Salinger v. United States, 272 U.S. 542 (1926), the Supreme Court stated: "The
right of confrontation did not originate with the provision in the Sixth Amendment, but was
a common-law right having recognized exceptions. The purpose of that provision, this Court
often has said, is to continue and preserve that right, and not to broaden it or disturb the
[Vol. 40
RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION
tion of the sixth amendment was "not [a] reaching out for new guaranties," 30
i.e., that it did not create any additional rights. Rather, the right to confrontation
was believed to only guarantee those rights long established by the common law
hearsay rule-cross-examination and confrontation.3 7 Moreover, since the right
to confrontation and the hearsay rule were considered similar in concept, an
exception to one would be an exception to the other. Thus, it was early stated
that hearsay exceptions "well established before the adoption of the constitution
... [were] not intended to be abrogated." 38 This interpretation of the confronta-
tion clause continued until first varied in Snyder v. Massachusetts.3 Noting
that a hearsay exception need not be long established to be an exception to the
confrontation clause, Mr. Justice Cardozo stated, in dicta, that the exceptions
to the right of confrontation "are not even static, but may be enlarged from time to
time if there is no material departure from the reason of the general rule."' 0 This
limited view of confrontation was prevalent until a number of "watershed" cases
were decided, beginning in 1965 with Pointer v. Texas.41 These decisions in-
volved two types of cases. The first dealt with actual hearsay situations where
the statements were admitted against the defendant for their truth. The second,
on the other hand, concerned statements which were not technically hearsay
since they were not so admitted against the defendant, but which created situa-
tions that were so prejudicial to him that their admission was tantamount to the
admission of hearsay.
IV. THE WATERSHED
A. Technical Hearsay Situations
In Pointer v. Texas, the Supreme Court held that the constitutional right of
a defendant to confront witnesses against him is made obligatory on the states
exceptions." Id. at 548; see Dowdell v. United States, 221 US. 325, 330 (1911); Kirby v.
United States, 174 U.S. 47, 61 (1899); Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 282 (1897);
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895).
36. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895).
37. Salinger v. United States, 272 US. 542, 548 (1926); see Larkin 68; Right to Prepare
a Defense 941; Comment, The Use of Prior Recorded Testimony and The Right of Con-
frontation, 54 Iowa L. Rev. 360, 364 (1968); Comment, Hearsay, The Confrontation Guar-
antee and Related Problems, 30 La. L. Rev. 651, 652 (1970). See also cases cited at note 35
supra.
38. Kirby v. United States, 174 US. 47, 61 (1899). See McCormick § 231, at 486.
39. 291 U.S. 97 (1934). See Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 825 (1958), where the court noted that the confrontation clause "was intended to
prevent the trial of criminal cases upon affidavits, not to serve as a rigid and inflexible bar-
rier against the orderly development of reasonable and necessary exceptions to the hearsay
rule.' Id. at 480. In Matthews v. United States, 217 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1954), the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that the confrontation clause allows "new excep-
tions to the hearsay rule based upon real necessity and adequate guarantees of trustworthli-
ness... 2' Id. at 418.
40. 291 US. at 107.
41. 380 U.S. 400 (1965). The other decisions involved were Bruton v. United States, 391
U.S. 123 (1968); Barber v. Page, 390 US. 719 (1968); and Douglas v. Alabama, 380 US.
415 (1965).
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by the fourteenth amendment.42 In Pointer, the Court examined the "cross-
examination" requirement of the prior recorded testimony exception to the
hearsay rule.43 The prosecution had introduced a transcript of an absent wit-
ness' testimony taken at a preliminary hearing. The defendant, though present
at the hearing, was not represented by counsel and did not cross-examine the
witness. The state court admitted the testimony on the ground that the defen-
dant's presence at the hearing afforded him an opportunity to cross-examine the
witness. Viewing the right to confrontation as a fundamental right essential to
the conduct of a fair trial, the Supreme Court held that the use of a statement
given at a preliminary hearing where the defendant did not have an adequate
opportunity for cross-examination violated his constitutional right to confront
the witnesses against him.4 4 The Court stated:
It cannot seriously be doubted at this late date that the right of cross-examination
is included in the right of an accused in a criminal case to confront the witnesses
against him .... There are few subjects, perhaps, upon which this Court and other
courts have been more nearly unanimous than in their expressions of belief that the
right of confrontation and cross-examination is an essential and fundamental require.
ment for the kind of fair trial which is this country's constitutional goal.4"
Examining the circumstances under which the testimony was given, the Court
noted that a mere technical opportunity to cross-examine is not sufficient grounds
for the admission of extrajudicial testimony under the prior recorded testimony
exception. 46 Since the testimony was not subjected to complete and adequate
cross-examination, it could not qualify as prior recorded testimony within the
exception, and therefore its admission at defendant's trial was violative of the
hearsay rule and at the same time constituted an abridgement of the confronta.
tion clause. 47
42. 380 U.s. at 403. In applying the confrontation clause to the states, the Court over-
ruled its decisions in Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 195-96 (1953), and Vest v. Louisiana,
194 U.S. 258, 264 (1904).
43. The admission of prior recorded testimony is based upon "1) an inability to obtain
the witness, 2) an opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the former trial, 3) an identity
or substantial identity of issues in the two proceedings and 4) substantial identity of parties.
The opportunity for cross-examination is considered the most essential because the credibility
of the witness can be tested through direct confrontation." Comment, The Use of Prior Re-
corded Testimony, supra note 37, at 362 (footnotes omitted). The origins of the prior recorded
testimony exception can be traced back to the common law. See The King v. Jolliffe, 100
Eng. Rep. 1022 (K.B. 1791); The King v. Vipont, 97 Eng. Rep. 767 (K.B. 1761). Prior tes-
timony has also been held admissible as an exception to the confrontation clause in Dowdell
v. United States, 221 U.S. 325, 330 (1911) ; Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 240 (1895).
For a general discussion of this exception see McCormick §§ 230-38.
44. 380 U.S. at 406-07.
45. Id. at 404-05.
46. Id. at 407-08. See also Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966), where the Court held
that the right to confrontation is so important that counsel can not waive it without the
consent of the defendant. Id. at 7.
47. 380 U.S. at 407.
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A similar situation arose in Barber v. Page48 There, the Supreme Court ex-
amined the "unavailability" requirement of the prior recorded testimony excep-
tion to the hearsay rule 49 In Barber, the prosecution introduced the prior
recorded testimony of a witness who was in a federal prison in another state.50
The defendant had been present at the prior proceeding and had cross-examined
the witness. However, the prosecution made no attempt to produce the witness
at trial.5' According to traditional hearsay rules, testimony given at a prior
proceeding would be admissible if the witness was out of the jurisdiction and
beyond the compulsory process of the court. 0 Emphasizing that "Ithe right
of confrontation may not be dispensed with so lightly, ' 'rs the Court held that a
witness is not unavailable, as a constitutional matter, unless the prosecution has
made a good faith effort to obtain his presence.54 Whatever may have been the
efficacy of the traditional unavailability requirement, it no longer had any validity
in view of the expanded cooperation between the states.ns Although the witness
was out of the jurisdiction, he was not in fact unavailable. Therefore, since the
testimony did not come within the exception, it was hearsay and, as such, viola-
tive of the defendant's right of confrontation. 0 Noting that "[t]he right to
confrontation is basically a trial right,"57 the Barber Court reiterated that a jury
must be allowed to weigh the credibility of a witness by observing his demeanor
at trial.5 s It is only in this manner that a defendant may be provided with protec-
48. 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
49. See note 43 supra.
50. 390 U.S. at 722.
51. Id. at 723. See United States ex rel. Stubbs v. Mancusi, 442 F.2d 561 (2d Cir. 1971),
wherein the court was confronted with the issue of whether a witness was per se "unavail-
able" in order that his prior recorded testimony could be introduced at trial. The witness
was out of the country, and the prosecution made no attempt to obtain his presence. Relying
on Barber, the court held that the prosecution must make a good faith effort to produce a
witness who, unlike the Barber witness, was not in custody. Stubbs would seem to raise
questions as to the validity of the criminal deposition section of the Organized Crime Con-
trol Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3503(f) (1970), which provides for the use of a witness' deposition
based on the sole requisite of his absence from the country.
52. 5 Wigrmore § 1404; see note 43 supra.
53. 390 U.S. at 725.
54. Id. at 724-25. See Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314 (1969), where the Court ac-
knowledged that "one of the important objects of the right of confrontation was to guarantee
that the fact finder had an adequate opportunity to assess the credibility of witnesses." Id.
at 315. In so holding, the Court gave Barber retroactive effect. Id.
55. 390 U.S. at 723-24.
56. Id. at 724-25.
57. Id. at 725.
58. Id. The Barber Court indicated that had the witness been actually unavailable, then
the use of his testimony given at a preliminary hearing subject to cross-examination would
not have denied the defendant of his right of confrontation. Id. at 725-26; cf. Virgin Islands
v. Aquino, 378 F.2d 540 (3rd Cir. 1967); Holman v. Washington, 364 F2d 618 (Sth Cir.
1966).
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tion equivalent to that afforded by actual confrontation. The Court thus held
that to deny confrontation of a witness, he must actually be unavailable."
In Pointer and Barber, the Supreme Court illustrated its willingness to
scrutinize the admission of out-of-court testimony to determine if it provided
adequate protection to justify a denial of confrontation. The mere fact that
testimony was introduced under a traditional hearsay exception did not, in and
of itself, satisfy the confrontation clause. The Court examined the circumstances
of the admission to see if the requirements of the hearsay exception-real
necessity and reliability-were fulfilled.
B. Non-Technical Hearsay Situations
The second group of cases, beginning with Douglas v. Alabama,60 involved
situations in which the out-of-court statements were not admitted against the
defendant for their truth.61 The introduction of these statements, though not
technically hearsay, was so prejudicial to the defendant as to result in a denial of
confrontation. In Douglas, the prosecution introduced a statement made by an
alleged accomplice at a separate trial. Although the accomplice was called as a
witness at the defendant's trial, he refused to respond to any questions, claiming
his right against self-incrimination. 62 The prosecution, under the guise of refresh-
ing the accomplice's memory, read the testimony which he had given at the prior
trial. Because the statement was not introduced to prove the truth of its content,
it was not technically hearsay. 63 However, the accomplice's refusal to acknowl-
edge his statements created, in effect, a hearsay problem as well as one of confron-
tation.6 As the Court noted, the prosecution's "reading may well have been
59. 390 U.S. at 724-25.
60. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
61. For testimony to be hearsay it must be offered to prove the truth of the matter stated.
However, if the testimony is used non-assertively, then it is admissible. McCormick § 225,
at 459-61. Whether it is hearsay or not, then depends on the purpose for which it is intro-
duced. Thus, evidence offered to show that a statement was made or to show a state of mind
or knowledge is not hearsay. Glassman v. Barron, 277 Mass. 376, 178 N.E. 628 (1931); Pat-
terson-Stocking, Inc. v. Dunn Bros. Storage Wharehouses, 201 Minn. 308, 276 N.W. 737
(1937); see Hooper-Hohnes Bureau, Inc. v. Bunn, 161 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1947) (statement
in slander action held admissible to show malice); Callen v. Gill, 7 N.J. 312, 81 A.2d 495
(1951) (testimony held admissible as to statements by child to show state of mind); Loetsch
v. New York City Omnibus Corp., 291 N.Y. 308, 52 N.E.2d 448 (1943) (statement In de-
ceased's will held admissible in wrongful death action to show hostility of husband). The
Loetsch court stated: "No testimonal effect need be given to the declaration, but the fact
that such a declaration was made by the decedent, whether true or false, is compelling evi-
dence of her feelings toward, and relations to, her husband." Id. at 311, 52 N.E.2d at 449.
62. 380 U.S. at 416. The accomplice, who had been tried separately and convicted, plan-
ned to appeal. He, therefore, invoked his fifth amendment right against self-incrimination.
Id.
63. See note 61 supra.
64. 380 U.S. at 419; see Comment, Federal Confrontation: A Not Very Clear Say On
Hearsay, 13 U.C.LA.L. Rev. 366 (1966), where the author stated: "Douglas demonstrated
that testimony need not actually be offered for the probative value of its content to deny
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the equivalent in the jury's mind of testimony that [the accomplice] in fact
made the statement; and [his] reliance upon the privilege created a situation in
which the jury might improperly infer both that the statement had been made
and that it was true." 65 The Court thus held that, although the statement was
not hearsay, the defendant was denied his right to confrontation" Cross-
examination of the officers to whom the alleged statement was made could not,
according to the Court, substitute for confrontation. "[T]heir evidence tended
to show only that [the accomplice] made the confession, cross-examination of
them... could not substitute for cross-examination of [the accomplice] to test
the truth of the statement itself.M7
Similarly, in Bruton v. United States,.8 the Supreme Court held that a defen-
dant was denied his right to confrontation when the court, in a joint trial,
admitted a co-defendant's confession which had not been subjected to cross-
examination.P9 In that case, a witness testified that the co-defendant-declarant
orally divulged his own as well as the defendant's participation in the crime. The
witness' testimony, being admitted against the co-defendant only, was not
confrontation. In Douglas, the testimony was read in open court before the jury and could
have had its harmful effect without being entered as hearsay. The suggestion in Douglas,
then, is that the Court will look behind the hearsay-non-hearsay distinction and will require
confrontation in either case if prejudice will result to the defendant. ... When the jury is
not able to make the necessary distinction between hearsay and non-hearsay purposes, the
defendant is certainly prejudiced. Therefore, operation of the standard in this area should
require a direct consideration of potential prejudice to the defendant, in addition to the
basic elements of reliability and need in evaluating hearsay exceptions." Id. at 377-78 (foot-
notes omitted) (emphasis omitted). Other commentators have also urged that an extra-judidal
statement, though offered non-assertively, should not be automatically admitted unless its
admission is considered in the light of the risk of undue prejudice to the defendant. Comment,
Hearsay, The Confrontation Guarantee and Related Problems, 30 La. L. Rev. 6S1, 660 (1970);
Comment, Hearsay and Non-Hearsay as Reflected in Louisiana Criminal Cases, 14 La. L.
Rev. 611, 617 (1954).
65. 380 U.S. at 419 (citations omitted). Cf. Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350
U.S. 551, 557-58 (1956); United States v. Maloney, 262 F.2d 535, 537 (2d Cir. 1959). The
Douglas Court also noted that, although the prosecution's reading of the purported confession
was not hearsay, "Loyd could not be cross-examined on a statement imputed to but not
admitted by him." 380 US. at 419. See Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179, 187 (1963)
where the court stated: [The] inferences from a witness' refusal to answer added critical
weight to the prosecution's case in a form not subject to cross-examination, and thus unfairly
prejudiced the defendant." See also Fletcher v. United States, 332 F.2d 724 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
66. 380 U.S. at 420.
67. Id.
68. 391 U.S. 123 (1968). See Note, Trial By Jury In Criminal Cases, 69 Colum. L. Rev.
419, 449-60 (1969); Note, The Admission of a Codefendant's Confession After Bruton v.
United States: The Questions and a Proposal For Their Resolution, 1970 Duke L.J. 329;
The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 63, 231-38 (1968); Comment, Bruton v.
United States: A Belated Look At The Warren Court Concept Of Criminal Justice, 44 St.
John's L. Rev. 54 (1969).
69. 391 U.S. at 137.
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technically hearsay as to the defendant.7 0 Again, as in Douglas, the introduction
of the confessiorn created a situation which was highly prejudicial to the defendant.
Thus, the jury would believe "not just.., portions [incriminating the co-defen-
dant] but those implicating [the defendant] as well."''7 Since the co-defendant
refused to take the stand and could not be cross-examined as to his statements,
the trial court gave limiting instructions to the jury to the effect that the con-
fession was admissible against the co-defendant but not against the defendant.
The court of appeals, relying on Delli Paoli v. United States,72 affirmed the de-
fendant's conviction on the ground that the limiting instructions were sufficient
to enable a jury to ignore the uncross-examined confession implicating the de-
fendant.73 However, the Supreme Court rejected this reasoning and held that
the defendant was denied his right of confrontation.74 The Court emphasized the
jury's inability to "'segregate evidence into separate intellectual boxes.' ,75
70. An out-of-court statement is hearsay when it is introduced against a defendant for
its truth. See note 61 supra and accompanying text. In Bruton, the alleged confession was
introduced only against the co-defendant. 391 U.S. at 123-24. It was not used for its truth
against Bruton. Therefore, it was not technically hearsay.
71. 391 U.S. at 127.
72. 352 U.S. 232 (1957). Delli Paoli was a modification of Blumenthal v. United States,
332 U.S. 539 (1947), where the Court held that instructions to the jury left "no room for
doubt that the admissions were adequately excluded . . . ." Id. at 551-52. In Dell Paoli,
however, the Court required that the circumstances of each case be examined to determine
if the jury could reasonably comply with the instructions. 352 U.S. at 239. Deli Paoli as.
sumed that if a jury could comply then there, would be no denial of confrontation in a
criminal case Id. at 242-43. Prior to the Bruton decision, this assumption was criticized by
a number of courts and commentators. See United States ex rel. Floyd v. Wilkins, 367 F.2d
990 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. Bozza, 365 F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1966); Jones v. United
States, 342 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Barton v. United States, 263 F.2d 894 (5th Cir.
1959) ; People v. Aranda, 63 Cal. 2d 518, 407 P.2d 265, 47 Cal. Rptr. 353 (1965) ; State v.
Young, 46 N.J. 152, 215 A.2d 352 (1965); People v. Vitagliano, 15 N.Y.2d 360, 206 N.E.2d
864, 258 N.Y.S.2d 839 (1965); Note, Joint And Single Trials Under Rules 8 and 14 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 74 Yale L.J. 553, 554-55 (1965).
73. Evans v. United States, 375 F.2d 355 (8th Cir. 1967), rev'd sub nom. Bruton v.
United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
74. 391 U.S. at 126.
75. Id. at 131. See Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 285 U.S.
556 (1932), wherein Judge Learned Hand stated that the use of limiting instructions Is a
"recommendation to the jury of a mental gymnastic which is beyond, not only their powers,
but anybody's else [sic]." Id. at 1007. Accord, Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453
(1949) (concurring opinion) ; People v. Barbaro, 395 Il1. 264, 69 N.E.2d 692 (1946) ; State v.
Rosen, 151 Ohio 339, 86 N.E.2d 24 (1949). Forrecent studies on the jury's inability to Ignore
incriminating evidence regardless of instructions see Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury
Project, 38 Neb. L. Rev. 744 (1959); Note, The Limiting Instruction-Its Effectivenesm and
Effect, 51 Minn. L. Rev. 264 (1966). The Broeder project was undertaken among a group
of thirty juries. A tape of a hypothetical injury action was played to three groups of ten
juries. The tape played to all three groups, however, differed as to a statement made by
the plaintiff. The tape played to the first group contained a statement read, without objec-
tion by the defendant's attorney, that the defendant had no liability insurance. The average
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Such instructions -were not, according to the Court, "an adequate substitute for
[the defendant's] constitutional right of cross-examination.""'
Thus, in Douglas and Bruton, the Supreme Court illustrated the potential
dangers to a defendant when a court does not distinguish between a hearsay and a
non-heArsay situation. Although the evidence was not introduced against the
defendant for if's 'truth, it's effect was so prejudicial that the defendant was
denied his right to confrontation. In such cases, the Court noted the primary
importance of the availability of the declarant for cross-examination. Unless he
is available for effective cross-examination and confrontation, the out-of-court
testimony will not be admitted at trial.
V. THE PosT-BRuTON ERA
As a result of these decisions many commentatorse were of the opinion that the
rights secured by the confrontation clause were so basic and fundamental that
traditional hearsay exceptions were violative of a defendant's constitutional right
to a fair trial.-The dying declaration exception, thus, was considered a violation
of the confrontation clause on the basis of "the inability of the defendant to
cross-examine the 'real' witness .... '1 Another commentator79 concluded that
if evidence
recovery given by this group was $33,000. The second tape contained the same statement,
but this time the defendant's attorney did object. The average recovery given by the second
group was $37,000. The third tape contained the statement that the defendant did have lia-
bility insurance. Here an instruction was made by the judge to ignore it. The average recovery
rewarded by the last group was $46,000. Broeder, supra, at 754.
76. 391 U.S. at 137. See Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (1968), which applied Bruton
retroactively since the evidence admitted in violation of the Bruton rule "'went to the basis
of [a] fair hearing and trial... ? " Id. at 294.
77. Larkin 85-86; Comment, The Admissibility of Dying Declarations, 38 Fordham L.
Rev. 509, 523 (1970); Comment, The Use of Prior Recorded Testimony and the Right of
Confrontation, 54 Iowa L. Rev. 360, 364 (1968) ("The constitutional concept of confronta-
tion has grown and developed into a concept with its own definitive meanings and appli-
cations. In many instances the elements of the hearsay rule have not kept pace with the
development of the confrontation clause, and their continued use may be depriving criminal
defendants of their constitutional right of confrontation. If a new standard of confrontation
is evolving, the hearsay rule must be re-examined in light of that standard. Simply because
some particular circumstances might justify an exception to the hearsay rule does not neces-
sarily insure that the new confrontation requirements have been met despite the fact that
the circumstances might have satisfied the old requirements."); Comment, Bruton v. United
States: A Belated Look at the Warren Court Concept of Criminal Justice, 44 St. John's L.
Rev. 54, 66 (1969); see The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 63, 237 (1963)
where the authors stated: "[I]f the declarant is not available to testify, an exception to
the hearsay rule which would permit introduction of his testimony despite his absence would
seem to violate the confrontation clause." For cases illustrating that the confrontation right
might be broader than the hearsay rule see Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967);
United-States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966).
78. Comment, The Admissibility of Dying Declarations, 38 Fordham L. Rev. 509, 523
-(1970). See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
79. Larkin 85-86.
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depends for its probative value upon the testimonial credibility of some person, that
person must present the evidence in person. Exceptions to this rule may be recognized
when, and only when, the ideal of fairness as served by the full satisfaction of all as-
pects of physical confrontation is outweighed by the necessity to avoid a completo
failure of justice .... Probably falling before this muster . may be such old
familiar friends as declarations against interest, [and] writings containing past recollec-
tion recorded .... 80
This type of thinking was adopted in several lower court cases"' decided sub-
sequent to Bruton. Two such cases were People v. Johnson82 and Evans v. Dut-
ton.83 In Johnson, the Supreme Court of California held that an expanded hearsay
exception allowing prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence 4 was a
violation of the confrontation clause.85 In reaching this decision, the court
stressed the Supreme Court's "belief in the importance of ensuring that the
defendant's right to conduct his cross-examination before a contemporaneous
trier of fact, i.e., before the same trier who sits in judgment on the truth of the
80. Id. at 86 (emphasis added).
81. See Evans v. Dutton, 400 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1968), rev'd, 400 U.S. 74 (1970) ; People
v. Green, 70 Cal. 2d 654, 451 P.2d 422, 75 Cal. Rptr. 782 (1969), rev'd sub. nom. California
v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970); People v. Johnson, 68 Cal. 2d 646, 441 P.2d 111, 68 Cal.
Rptr. 599 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1051 (1969); Schepps v. State, 432 S.W.2d 926
(Tex. Crim. App. 1968); cf. United States v. Barbati, 284 F. Supp. 409 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
82. 68 Cal. 2d 646, 441 P.2d 111, 68 Cal. Rptr. 599 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1051
(1969).
83. 400 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1968), rev'd, 400 U.S. 74 (1970). See Schepps v. State, 432
S.W.2d 926 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968), wherein the defendant was convicted as a result of the
confession of an accomplice who was tried separately. In holding that the admission was
improper, the court stated that the confrontation right embodies "the requirements of real
necessity and adequate guarantees of trustworthiness as essential to all exceptions to the rule,
present or future, for otherwise legislative bodies and courts could abolish the right of con-
frontation by simply making unlimited exceptions to the hearsay rule." Id. at 941. Cf. United
States v. Barbati, 284 F. Supp. 409 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), where the court indicated that, In a
criminal case, extrajudicial statements should be closely scrutinized and reevaluated by the
court. Such evidence, the court noted should be admitted only when there is no more satis-
factory evidence and the availability of the declarant for cross-examination affords the de-
fendant adequate protection. Id. at 412.
84. Cal. Evid. Code § 1235 (West 1966). For text of the statute see note 94 Infra. See
also People v. Green, 70 Cal. 2d 654, 451 P.2d 422, 75 Cal. Rptr. 782 (1969), rev'd sub
nom. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970). In Johnson, the testimony of a witness before
a grand jury was admitted at trial as substantive evidence. At trial, the witness denied the
truthfulness of the testimony. The prosecution was then permitted to introduce the prior
inconsistent statement. 68 Cal. 2d at 648-51, 441 P.2d at 113-15, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 601-02.
85. 68 Cal. 2d at 660, 441 P.2d at 120, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 609; see Bridges v. Wixon, 326
U.S. 135, 153-54 (1945), where the Supreme Court held that an extrajudicial statement, while
permissible for impeachment purposes, "certainly would not be admissible In any criminal
cases as substantive evidence.. . . So to hold would allow men to be convicted on unsworn
testimony of witnesses-a practice which runs counter to the notions of fairness on which
our legal system is founded." (citations and footnotes omitted).
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witness' direct testimony as it is spoken from the stand."8 0 In Evans v. Dutton,6
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals struck down a statutory exception admitting
co-conspirator's statements made in the concealment stage of the conspiracy.ns
Emphasizing that "hearsay exceptions in criminal cases must be continually
scrutinized and reevaluated"3 9 in light of the confrontation clause, the court held
that the hearsay exception was unconstitutional since "[a ] criminal defendant
cannot... be convicted upon the testimony of ... witnesses whose credibility is
unknown and unknowable by the trier of fact-' 90
The effect of Pointer, Douglas, Bruton, and the other "watershed" cases is
obvious. The lower courts, stirred by the apparent thrust of these decisions, began
to strike down various exceptions to the hearsay rule as violations of the con-
frontation clause on a case by case basis. The Supreme Court, the prime mover
in this trend, had left little in the way of guidance and the primary question-
whether or not all hearsay exceptions were beyond the pale of constitutionality-
still awaited a definitive answer.91 The Court responded with a trilogy of cases92
which indicated that the exceptions to the hearsay rule retained considerable
vitality and that the confrontation clause was not as broad in sweep as Pointer
and its companions seemed to indicate.
VI. RECENT CASES
A. California v. Green
In California v. Green,9 3 the Supreme Court was confronted with the issue of
whether a state could expand a hearsay exception to allow prior inconsistent
statements as substantive evidence.94 The traditional rule was that such state-
86. 68 Cal. 2d at 660,441 P.2d at 120, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 608.
87. 400 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1968), rev'd, 400 US. 74 (1970).
88. Id. at 831-32. For the facts of this case see notes 106-10 infra and accompanying text.
89. 400 F.2d at 830. The court, relying on Barber v. Page, 390 US. 719 (1968), and
Pointer v. Texas, 380 US. 400 (196S), noted that "if an accused is to be deprived of the
right to confront and to be confronted by the witnesses against him, there must be salient
and cogent reasons for the deprivation." 400 F.2d at 830. Since the hearsay exception involved
went beyond the traditional co-conspirator exception and no cogent reasons were involved,
the admission of the extrajudicial statement was "repugnant to the sixth amendment.' Id.
at 831. The traditional co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule allows admission of out-
of-court statements made only in furtherance of the conspiracy and not in the concealment
stage. Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 216-17 (1946); see Proposed Fed. R. Evid.
801(d) (2) (v), 51 F.,.D. 315, 413 (1971). See also cases cited note 111 infra.
90. 400 F.2d at 830.
91. See The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 63, 236 (1968).
92. Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622 (1971); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970); Cali-
fornia v. Green, 399 U.S. 491 (1970).
93. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
94. Id. at 155. The statutory hearsay exception involved was Cal. Evid. Code § 123S
(West 1966), -which states: "Evidence of a statement made by a witness is not made inad-
missible by the hearsay rule if the statement is inconsistent with his testimony at the hearing
and is offered in compliance with Section 770." Id. § 770 states: "Unless the interests of justice
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ments could only be used to impeach a witness' credibility. 5 However, California
made a statutory change to reflect the minority view."0 In Green, the declarant
was, at the time the operative events transpired, under the influence of an hal-
lucinogenic drug. He was able, however, shortly thereafter, to make a statement
incriminating the defendant. At trial, the declarant took the stand, but was un-
able to recall anything about the events at issue. The prosecution, after the
declarant had admitted making the statement, was successful in introducing it
under the California version of the prior inconsistent statement exception to the
hearsay rule.
On appeal,9 7 the Supreme Court of California held that the hearsay exception
at issue was a violation of the defendant's confrontation right since it did not
require legal necessity as a basis for admission. 98 The court stated: "This excep-
tion ... adds the factor of necessity to the constitutional aspect of confrontation
-which factor may, in appropriate cases, outweigh the lack of contemporary
cross-examination. Of course, no such 'necessity' exists where the witness is
present to testify at trial ... ."90 In reversing, the Supreme Court of the United
otherwise require, extrinsic evidence of a statement made by a witness that is inconsistent
with any part of his testimony at the hearing shall be excluded unless: (a) The witness was so
examined while testifying as to give him an opportunity to explain or to deny the statement;
or (b) The witness has not been excused from giving further testimony in the action."
95. 399 U.S. at 154; see Ellis v. United States, 138 F.2d 612, 616-21 (8th Cir. 1943);
United States v. Biener, 52 F. Supp. 54 (EDl. Pa. 1943). In State v. Saporen, 205 Minn. 358,
285 N.W. 898 (1939), the court stated: "The chief merit of cross-examination Is not that at
some future time it gives the party opponent the right to dissect adverse testimony. Its prin-
cipal virtue is in its immediate application of the testing process. Its strokes fall while the
iron is hot." Id. at 362, 285 N.W. at 901. For criticism of the orthodox view see United
States v. De Sisto, 329 F.2d 929, 933-34 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 979 (1964) ; United
States v. Rainwater, 283 F.2d 386 (8th Cir. 1960); United States v. Allied Stevedoring Corp.,
241 F.2d 925, 935 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 984 (1957) ; United States ex rel. Ng Kee
Wong v. Corsi, 65 F.2d 564, 565 (2d Cir. 1933); Di Carlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 364, 368
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 268 U.S. 706 (1925); McCormick § 39; 3A Wigmore § 1018, at 996
n.2 (3d rev. ed. Chadbourn 1970) ; Morgan 192-96. A recent Second Circuit case explaining the
minority position is United States v. Fiore, 443 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1971), wherein a witness
refused to testify and the prosecution was permitted to introduce his prior testimony as sub.
stantive evidence. The court reversed, indicating that a witness' prior inconsistent testimony
can be used as substantive evidence only if the witness is available at trial for "meaningful
cross-examination." Id. at 115. See Rule 801 of the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence
which defines prior statements by a witness as non-hearsay when he "testifies at the trial or
hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is
(i) inconsistent with his testimony .... " 51 F.R.D. at 413.
96. 399 U.S. at 154. For the text of the statute see note 94 supra.
97. People v. Green, 70 Cal. 2d 654, 451 P.2d 422, 76 Cal. Rptr. 782 (1969), rev'd sub
nom. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
98. Id. at 664-66, 451 P.2d at 428-29, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 788-89.
99. Id. at 664, 451 P.2d at 428, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 788. Relying on Barber v. Page, 390
U.S. 719 (1968), and People v. Johnson, 68 Cal. 2d 646, 441 P.2d 111, 68 Cal. Rptr. 599
(1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1051 (1969), the California court noted that "cross-examination
at trial on prior testimony, together with cross-examination at the time of the statement beforo
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States specifically stated that although the hearsay rule and the right of con-
frontation protect similar values, they are not co-extensive. "[Tjhe Confronta-
tion Clause is [not] a codification of the rules of hearsay and their exceptions as
they existed historically at common law... [Mierely because evidence is ad-
mitted in violation of a long-established hearsay rule does not lead to the
automatic conclusion that confrontation rights have been denied."' 00 Reviewing
its previous confrontation cases, the Court held that the confrontation clause is
not violated when a declarant is present at trial and subject to cross-examina-
tion.' 0 ' "As a constitutional matter," according to the Court, "it is untenable to
construe the Confrontation Clause to permit the use of prior testimony... where
the declarant never appears, but to bar that testimony where the declarant is
present at the trial .... ,no0
The implications of Green are clear. There are areas where the right of con-
frontation and the hearsay rule do not overlap. It is only where the declarant is
unavailable that they cover the same groundj 03 The confrontation clause only
requires that a witness appear before the jury to testify as to the circumstances
of his earlier statements. 0 4 In cases like Douglas v. Alabama,0 5 the hearsay and
a different trier of fact, is not a valid substitute for constitutionally adequate confrontation."
70 Cal. 2d at 665, 451 P.2d at 429, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 789.
100. 399 U.S. at 155-56.
101. Id. at 158. Mr. Justice White, writing for the majority, noted that the right of
confrontation: "(1) insures that the witness will give his statements under oath-thus im-
pressing him with the seriousness of the matter and guarding against the lie by the pos-
sibility of a penalty for perjury; (2) forces the witness to submit to cross-examination,
the 'greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth'; (3) permits the jury
that is to decide the defendant's fate to observe the demeanor of the witness in making his
statement, thus aiding the jury in assessing his credibility.
"It is, of course, true that the out-of-court statement may have been made under circum-
stances subject to none of these protections. But if the declarant is present and testifying at
trial, the out-of-court statement for all practical purposes regains most of the lost protec-
tions." Id. (footnote omitted).
102. Id. at 166. "As in the case where the witness is physically unproducible, the State
here has made every effort to introduce its evidence through the live testimony of the wit-
ness .... Whether [the witness] then testified in a manner consistent or inconsistent with
his preliminary hearing testimony ...nothing in the Confrontation Clause prohibited the
State from also relying on his prior testimony to prove its case ... ." Id. at 167-6S. See The
Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 32, 112 (1970); 59 Calif. L. Rev. 580, 590-92
(1971); 39 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 415, 426-27 (1970); 1970 Utah L. Rev. 668, 672-78.
103. In Green, the Court stated that the confrontation clause does not come into play
when the declarant is present at trial. Rather, it only involves "situations where statements
have been admitted in the absence of the declarant and without any chance to cross-
examine him at trial." 399 U.S. at 161. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1963);
Barber v. Page, 390 US. 719 (1968); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.. 415 (1965). Thus, even
if the hearsay rule would require the exclusion of extrajudicial statements of a declarant
who is present at trial, the confrontation clause would not require their exclusion.
104. See United States v. Williams, 447 F.2d 1285 (Sth Cir. 1971); United States v.
Weber, 437 F.2d 327, 336 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 932 (1971).
105. 380 US. 415 (1965) ;-see notes 60-67 supra and accompanying text
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confrontation problems did overlap since the witness, though present at trial, in
claiming his right against self-incrimination, was not available for cross-examina-
tion. However, as long as a declarant is available to testify as to circumstances
of his statement, then states may treat the statement as they wish in developing
effective evidentary rules.
B. Dutton v. Evans
A further indication of the Supreme Court's willingness to allow the states to
experiment with their rules of evidence is Dutton v. Evans.10 0 In Dutton, the
defendant and an accomplice were indicted for murder. The day following their
arraignment, the accomplice, while in jail, was asked by a fellow prisoner how he
had fared. The accomplice allegedly answered: "If it hadn't been for that dirty
son-of-a-bitch Alex Evans, we wouldn't be in this now."' 1 7 During defendant's
trial, this statement was introduced into evidence through the testimony of the
prisoner, under a Georgia statutory exception to the hearsay rule.108 The defen-
dant, unable to cross-examine the accomplice, who had been tried separately and
had not been called as a witness, was convicted and sentenced to death.10
The issue presented to the Court was whether a state's hearsay exception was
constitutionaly invalid since it did not conform to the federal rules of evidence." 0
Under the federal rules, a co-conspirator's statement is admissible against a
fellow conspirator when made in furtherance of the conspiracy but not in the
concealment phase as in the Georgia exception under consideration in Dutton."'
Relying on the assertion in Green that the confrontation clause and the hearsay
rule are not co-extensive, Mr. Justice Stewart, writing for the plurality, 12 held
106. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
107. Id. at 77.
108. Ga. Code Ann. § 38-306 (1954). "After the fact of conspiracy shall be proved, the
declarations by any one of the conspirators during the pendency of the criminal project
shall be admissible against all." Id.
109. The Georgia supreme court affirmed in Evans v. State, 222 Ga. 392, 150 S.E.2d 240
(1966), and the Supreme Court denied the defendant's petition for a writ of certiorari, Evans
v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 953 (1966). Having exhausted his state remedies, the defendant sought a
writ of habeas corpus in the federal district court alleging that he had been denied his sixth
amendment right of confrontation. The district court denied the writ, but the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit reversed in Evans v. Dutton, 400 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1968), rev'd,
400 U.S. 74 (1970). See notes 87-90 supra and accompanying text.
110. 400 U.S. at 80.
111. See Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957); Lutwak v. United States, 344
U.S. 604 (1953); Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949); Fiswick v. United
States, 329 U.S. 211 (1946); Levie, Hearsay and Conspiracy: A Reexamination of the Co-
Conspirators' Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 1159 (1954). The rationale
generally given for the admission of such statements is that a co-conspirator is an agent of
the defendant and, thus, the defendant is liable for his declarations. See Levie, supra, at
1163-64; Morgan, The Rationale of Vicarious Admissions, 42 Harv. L. Rev. 461 (1929).
112. Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and Blackmun joined in the plurality opin-
ion. Justice Blackmun also wrote a concurring opinion in which Chief Justice Burger joined.
Justice Harlan, who concurred only in the result, wrote a separate concurring opinion. Jus-
tice Marshall wrote the dissenting opinion in which Justices Black, Douglas and Brennan
joined.
[Vol. 40
1972] RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION
that the Supreme Court "never indicated that the limited contours of the hearsay
exception in federal conspiracy trials are required by the Sixth Amendment's
Confrontation Clause." 1 3 He further noted that since "the limits of [the federal]
exception have simply been defined by the Court in the exercise of its rule-
making power in the area of the federal law of evidence,' 14 a state hearsay ex-
ception that did not conform to it could not be said to violate the Constitution." ' '
As an alternative holding, the Dutton Court indicated that the admission of
the extrajudicial statement was proper in view of it's "indicia of reliability."1
According to Justice Stewart, there was no denial of confrontation on the issue of
whether the jury might improperly infer that the accompice-declarant identified
the defendant as the murderer when he blamed him for their predicament since:
First, the statement contained no express assertion about past fact, and consequently
it carried on its face a warning to the jury against giving the statement undue weight.
Second, [the accomplice's] personal knowledge of the identity and role of the other
participants in the triple murder is abundantly established by [a third accomplice's]
testimony and by [the accomplice's] prior conviction. ... Third, the possibility that
[the accomplice's] statement was founded on faulty recollection is remote in the ex-
treme. Fourth, the circumstances under which [the accomplice] made the statement
113. 400 U.S. at 82.
114. Id. (footnote omitted). See 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1970). Fed. R. Crim. P. 26 provides:
"In all trials the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open court, unless othervise
provided by an act of Congress or by these rules. The admissibility of evidence and the compe-
tency and privileges of witnesses shall be governed, except when an act of Congress or these
rules otherwise provide, by the principles of thd common law as they may be interpreted by
the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience." See generally Hawkins v.
United States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
115. In upholding this exception, the Court noted that none of the policy reasons com-
pelling a different result in federal trials was present in this case. 400 US. at 82-83. In federal
trials, the limits of the co-conspirator hearsay exception is an outgrowth of the Supreme
Court's "'disfavor' of 'attempts to broaden the already pervasive and wide-sweeping nets of
conspiracy prosecutions.'" Id. at 82, citing Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 404
(1957). However, in Dutton, the Court denied that this policy was factorial because the de-
fendant was not prosecuted for conspiracy but for murder. 400 US. at 83. But see Levie,
supra note 111, at 1173, indicating that the disfavor of such statements is a result of their
untrustworthy nature. A co-conspirator's statement "may be based on spite, fear, pique,
malice, a desire to stand well with the prosecutor, or many other motives not leading to
truth.' Id. Obviously, whether a defendant is charged with murder or the conspiracy to com-
mit murder, these dangers are still inherent.
116. 400 U.S. at 89. In admitting the extrajudicial statement, the plurality distinguished
the Court's prior confrontation cases on a factual basis. It contended that the admion of
the statement was not as crucial as that in Douglas v. Alabama since in that case it was part
of a coerced confession. Id. at 87. Also, the statement was not made during a joint trial as in
Bruton v. United States nor was it in transcript form as in Pointer v. Texas or Barber v.
Page. Id. Justice Marshall, in his dissenting opinion, noted that the plurality opinion was
based on a complete lack of authority. He criticized its attempt to distinguish the Court's
prior confrontation cases. Id. at 104-05. The plurality's emphasis on such facts as the accom-
plice's statement not being made at a joint trial or in written form "--though . . . [differ-
entiating] some of the cases-[is] surely irrelevant. Other cases have presented each of these
factors, and no reason is offered why the right to confrontation could be so limited." Id. at
105 (footnote omitted).
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were such as to give reason to suppose that [the accomplice] did not misrepre-
sent [the defendant's] involvement in the crime. These circumstances go beyond a
showing that [the accomplice] had no apparent reason to lie to [the witness]. His
statement was spontaneous, and it was against his penal interest to make it.117
The Court concluded that the presence of such indicia made it "wholly unreal"
that cross-examination of the alleged accomplice "could conceivably have shown
the jury that the statement, though made, might have been unreliable .... ""a
The indirection of the plurality's opinion was criticized by Mr. Justice Harlan.
In his concurring opinion, he underlined the plurality's failure to explain the
standard used to determine the constitutionality of the hearsay exception. 110
Not viewing the issue as one of confrontation, he asserted that the confrontation
clause was inadequate to weigh "the numerous factors [which must be con-
sidered] in passing on the appropriateness of rules of evidence." 12 0 Urging that
the right of confrontation provides merely a procedural guarantee of cross-
examination, he quoted Wignore, who had written:
The Constitution does not prescribe what kinds of testimonial statements . . . shall
117. Id. at 88-89. The third accomplice had been granted immunity in return for his
testifying against the defendant. For a discussion of the admissibility of his testimony see
id. at 108 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 89. The plurality admitted the accomplice's statement under these indicia with-
out determining if it was, in fact, reliable. As the first indicium, the plurality stressed that
the statement was not an "express assertion about past fact, and consequently it carried on
its face a warning to the jury against giving the statement undue weight." Id. at 88. This
reasoning hardly insures that the jury would not infer that the defendant was Identified
as the murderer. Preserving the Right to Confrontation 754-56. See Comment, Federal Con-
frontation: A Not Very Clear Say on Hearsay, 13 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 366 (1966), where It is
stated: "When the jury is not able to make the necessary distinction between hearsay and
non-hearsay purposes, the defendant is certainly prejudiced. Therefore, operation of the
standard in this area should require a direct consideration of potential prejudice to the de-
fendant, in addition to the basic elements of reliability and need in evaluating hearsay excep-
tions." Id. at 378 (footnote omitted). As the fourth indicium, the Court underlined the state-
ment's spontaneity. But see Stewart, Perception, Memory & Hearsay: A Criticism Of Present
Law and The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 1970 Utah L. Rev. 1, 28, for a discussion
of a spontaneous hearsay exception as "rtlhe most unreliable type of evidence admitted under
hearsay exception . . . ." Even putting aside this criticism, the statement, made twenty four
hours after the arraignment in response to a question, was hardly spontaneous. See generally 6
Wigmore § 1747; Morgan, Res Gestae, 12 Wash. L. Rev. & St. B.J. 91 (1937); Slough, Spon-
taneous Statements and State of Mind, 46 Iowa L. Rev. 224, 240-48 (1961). For a crit-
icism of the second indicium see Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 108 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
119. 400 U.S. at 96.
120. Id. Justice Harlan also noted that: "The conversion of a clause intended to regulate
trial procedure into a threat to much of the existing law of evidence and to future develop-
ments in that field is not an unnatural shift, for the paradigmatic evil the Confrontation
Clause was aimed at-trial by affidavit---can be viewed almost equally well as a gross viola-
tion of the rule against hearsay and as the giving of evidence by the affiant out of the pres-
ence of the accused and not subject to cross-examination by him. But however natural the
shift may be, once made it carries the seeds of great mischief for enlightened development in
the law of evidence." Id. at 94-95 (footnote omitted).
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be given infra-judicially,--this depends on the law of Evidence for the time being,-
but only what mode of procedure shall be followed-i.e. a cross-examining procedure
-in the case of such testimony as is required by the ordinary law of Evidence to be
given infra-judicially.12'
In adopting this view, Justice Harlan repudiated the view he had espoused in
Green 22 where he contended that the confrontation clause requires the produc-
tion of any available witness whose statements are used against a defendant.
However, he now felt that such a requirement would hinder the development
of the law of evidence' 23 in that it would require the production of a declarant
"where production would be unduly inconvenient [to the sovereign] and of
small utility to a defendant."'1 24 In its place, Justice Harlan proposed a due
process standard to determine the admissibility of statements under a hearsay
exception. Under such a test, a testimony offered as a hearsay exception would be
excluded when that result is deemed essential to a fair trial."
C. Nelson v. O'Neil
The last case in the trilogy, Nelson v. O'Neil,120 further illustrates that the
right to confrontation is not as broad as the language of the "watershed" cases
seemed to indicate. It now seems that the confrontation clause requires only that
an available declarant testify as to whether or not he, in fact, made the statement
and not necessarily to its truth or falsity. In Nelson, the defendant and co-defen-
dant were arrested for robbery. At their joint trial, a policeman testified that the
co-defendant had made an unsworn confession implicating both himself and the
defendant. The co-defendant was called to the stand and, under cross-examina-
tion, denied that he had made the confession. In admitting the testimony against
the co-defendant, the trial court gave limiting instructions to the jury to disregard
121. Id. at 94, quoting 5 Wigmore § 1397.
122. 399 U.S. at 186 (Harlan, J., concurring).
123. 400 US. at 95-96 (Harlan, J., concurring). "If the hearsay exception involved in a
given case is such as to commend itself to reasonable men, production of the declarant is
likely to be difficult, unavailing, or pointless." Id. at 96.
124. Id. at 96. Some examples of evidentiary rules that would otherwise fall if the
confrontation clause required the production of all declarants are hearsay exceptions in-
volving official statements, business records and scholarly treatises. See Gistrap v. United
States, 389 F.2d 6 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 913 (1968); Kay v. United States, 255
F.2d 476 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 US. 825 (1958); 28 US.C. §§ 1732-33 (1970); Uniform
Rules of Evidence 63(15), 30.
125. Justice Harlan went on to analyze the Court's prior confrontation cases against this
due process standard. As a matter of due process, he contended that the use of prior recorded
testimony in Pointer, Barber and Green would, "fi]n the absence of countervailing circum-
stances ... be an affront to the core meaning of the Confrontation Clause. The question in
each case, therefore, was whether there had been adequate 'confrontation' to s3tisfy the re-
quirement of the clause." Id. at 97. Also, Douglas v. Alabama could be viewed in the light
of due process as one of prosecutorial misconduct and Bruton v. United States as prohibiting
the introduction of an accomplice's confession unless adopted by him. Id. at 98.
126. 402 US. 622-(1971).
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it as to the defendant since it was hearsay as to him.127 The district court, relying
on Bruton v. United States, granted defendant's writ of habeas corpus because he
did not have an adequate opportunity to cross-examine his co-defendant as to the
truth of the confession. 128 The court of appeals affirmed the granting of the writ
on substantially the same grounds.129 However, the Supreme Court reversed the
court of appeals, holding that the confrontation clause does not require that a
declarant adopt a statement for there to be full and effective cross-examination. 1 0
The Court distinguished Bruton on the grounds that there "the witness ... was
... totally unavailable at trial for any kind of cross-examination."'91  Since the
co-defendant was not unavailable for cross-examination, there was no denial of
confrontation.
VII. CONCLUSION
A close analysis of the Court's confrontation decisions reveals three distinct
groups of cases. The first category, which includes Pointer and Barber, con-
templates a presumptively valid (confrontation-wise) exception to the hearsay
rule. In these cases, the offer of proof under the exception is violative of con-
frontation because it does not comply with the elements of the exception. 1 2
The second group of cases, including Bruton, Green, O'Neil and probably Douglas,
which may be termed pure confrontation decisions, turn essentially on the issue
127. Id. at 624.
128. Id. at 625.
129. O'Neil v. Nelson, 422 F.2d 319 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'd, 402 U.S. 622 (1971). In affirm-
ing, the court of appeals relied upon Douglas v. Alabama to the extent that Douglas stated
that a defendant is afforded "'effective confrontation ...only if [the witness] affirmed the
statement as his.'" Id. at 321, citing Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 420 (1965).
130. 402 U.S. at 629-30. The Court noted that although there was dictum in Douglas v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 419 (1965), and Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 127 (1968),
to the effect that a witness had to affirm his statement, neither of the two cases involved that
issue. 402 U.S. at 627-28.
131. 402 U.S. at 628 (emphasis added). In reaching its decision, the Court indicated that
the situation in Nelson was inverted from that in California v. Green. See notes 93-102 and
accompanying text. In Green, although the witness admitted making the statement, he was un-
able to testify as to the surrounding circumstances. In Nelson, however, "the witness ... denied
ever making an out-of-court statement but testified at length, and favorably to the defen-
dant, concerning the underlying facts." 402 U.S. at 628.
132. Compare Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), with Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719
(1968). In Pointer, the confrontation (cross-examination) was a necessary element of the
exception. See note 43 supra. The admission of the statement was therefore a denial of con-
frontation because it violated the hearsay rule. 380 U.S. at 407; see text accompanying notes
44-47 supra. In Barber, the same prior testimony exception was at issue. But there, the avail-
ability requirement of the rule was the focus of the Court's attention. The Court found that
the declarant, although incarcerated in another state, was indeed available and that, there-
fore, the admission of the statement did not fulfill the requirements of the exception. 390
U.S. at 724-25. The rather obvious implication is that, had the Pointer declarant been cross-
examined at the preliminary hearing, and the convict in Barber truly unavailable, there
would have been no violation of the hearsay rule and hence, no violation of confrontation.
See Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725-26 (1968) ; Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407 (1965).
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of availability. In these cases, irrespective of the nature of the proof set forth,
there will be no confrontation problem if the declarant of the extrajudicial state-
ment is indeed available for cross-examination. 133 The mere availability of the
witness being crucial, it does not matter that he is under some partial disability' 34
or refuses to affirm or disaffirm the content of the statemen 35 The third group
of cases, where the hearsay rule and the confrontation clause are said not to
overlap, 136 includes Dutton and its inevitable progeny.13 7 These cases employ a
two-tiered analysis, the first rationalizing the exception itself on more or less
constitutional grounds' 38 and the second examining the evidence to be introduced
under the exception for its inherent reliability. 30 Dutton suggests that the
admission of evidence under a long recognized exception to the hearsay rule,
under circumstances which indicate its reliability, is an adequate substitute for
the actual production of an extrajudicial declarant for cross-examination. 40
Viewed as such, Dutton would seem to violate the confrontation standard delin-
eated in Bruton and Green since the prosecution did not produce the declarant
even though he was available for cross-examination. l
The seeming ambiguity of the Green, Dutton and O'Neil decisions is a result
of the Court's groping for guidelines to determine the constitutionality of such a
situation. Although the Dutton Court, upheld the validity of a hearsay exception,
it failed to explain the constitutional standard used.1' In lieu thereof, almost
as an after-thought, the Court attempted to shore up the validity of its decision
by illustrating the reliability of the statement. 43 However, relying on a state-
ment's indicia of reliability for its admission will result in the Court's grappling
with factual situations on a case by case basis.144 It will require a close scrutiny
of the record to determine, first, whether the statement was reliable and, second,
133. Compare California v. Green, 399 US. 149, 158, 161 (1970), and Nelson v. O'Neil,
402 U.S. 622, 628 (1971), with Bruton v. United States, 391 US. 123, 127-28 (1968), and
Douglas v. Alabama, 380 US. 415, 419 (1965).
134. California v. Green, 399 US. 149, 152 (1970).
135. Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 US. 622, 628 (1971).
136. See California v. Green, 399 US. 149, 155, 161 (1970).
137. For an example of a state court applying the indicia of reliability as a four pronged
test to determine the admissibility of an extrajudicial statement see State v. Lunn, 82 N.M.
526, 484 P.2d 368 (1971). See also The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 3, 188-99
(1971).
138. Dutton v. Evans, 400 US. 74, 80-83 (1970).
139. Id. at 88-89.
140. Id.
141. See notes 116-17 supra and accompanying text. But it should be noted that unavail-
ability is not an element of one Georgia conspiracy exception. See Ga. Code Ann. § 38-306
(1954), quoted in note 108 supra.
142. 400 US. at 96 (Harlan, J., concurring); The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, supra note
137, at 191.
143. 400 US. at 88-89.
144. See Comment, Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule, 7S Yale L.J. 1437 (1966); note
117 supra and accompanying text.
1972]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
if not, whether its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.140 If a due
process standard is employed, the Court could avoid such ad hoc determinations
-questions of reliability and availability being irrelevant. Rather, the constitu-
tionality of a particular hearsay exception would depend on whether it was
fundamentally unfair.146 Such a standard would enable the development of evi-
dentiary rules to eliminate the requirement of necessity or unavailability where
production of the declarant "would be unduly inconvenient and of small utility
to a defendant."'1 47
Although a due process standard has been criticized as vague,148 the Court
has been able, in other areas, to determine when the government has exceeded
the bounds of fairness.149 There would seem to be no reason why the Supreme
Court could not exercise the same vigilance here.
145. See Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S.
18 (1967). In Chapman, the Court held "that before a federal constitutional error can
be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt." Id. at 24.
The Court will be faced with situations similar to that encountered by Mr. Justice Black.
mun in his concurring opinion in Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 90-93 (1970), where he re-
viewed not only the testimony of nineteen witnesses but also the setting in which the state.
ment was made. His examination took him to such minute details as the measurements of an
opening in the door through which the declarant allegedly spoke. Id. at 90-91.
,146. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), overruled on other grounds, Benton
v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), where Mr. Justice Cardozo defined due process as "the
very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty." Id. at 325. It is a "'principle of justice so rooted
in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.' Id. (citations
omitted).
147. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 96 (1970).
148. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 168 (1968) (Black, J., concurring).
149. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145 (1968) ; Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), overruled on other grounds, Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). For a discussion of the due process standard see Kadish,
Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey and Criticism, 66 Yale L.J.
319 (1957).
